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The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of 
technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher 
(2021) calls the investigation of “axiological futurism”. However, this investigation faces a 
challenge: “axiological possibility space” is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this 
space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculations about how values might change 
over time should exclude farfetched possibilities and be restricted to possibilities that can be 
dubbed to be realistic instead. But what does this realism criterion entail? This paper introduces 
the notion of realistic possibilities as a key conceptual advancement to the study of axiological 
futurism and offers suggestions as to how realistic possibilities of future value change might be 
identified. Additionally, I propose two slight modifications to the approach of axiological futurism. 
First, I argue that axiological futurism can benefit from a thoroughly historicised understanding of 
moral change. Secondly, I argue that when employed in normative contexts, the axiological 






While philosophers have long sought to unearth morality’s unshakable foundations, in recent years, 
there has been a growing scholarly interest in how morality evolves over time. Examples of recent 
and current moral shifts in Western societies include the moralisation of CO2-emissions, the 
demoralisation of homosexuality, and the elevated moral status of several non-human species. 
Taking a broader look at history, moral change abounds and manifests itself at various timescales. 
As a result, researchers from multiple fields have taken an interest in the topic, scrutinising, for 
instance, the evolutionary roots of moral cooperation (Boehm 2012; Sterelny 2021; Tomasello 
2016), the sociobiological and material pressures that have shaped moral systems throughout 
human history (Buchanan & Powell 2017; Kitcher 2011; Morris 2015), as well as the moral 
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revolutions the have occurred over the last few centuries (Appiah 2010; Baker 2019; Pleasants 
2018). 
Philosophers and ethicists of technology, too, have broached the topic of moral change, 
specifically by studying the dynamic relation between values and technology (Kudina 2019). While 
some work on technomoral change (Swierstra 2013) is historically oriented (Nickel et al. 2021; 
Hopster et al. MS), recent lines of investigation also include conceptual, normative, and 
anticipatory analyses of value change. For instance, van de Poel (2021) has articulated a typology 
of value change, while the technomoral scenario approach advanced by Boenink et al. (2010) is 
geared explicitly towards anticipating future trajectories of technomoral change. Such anticipatory 
work, in turn, is often connected with normative aims. By comparison, policymakers regularly 
invoke the normative planning method of backcasting: start with outlining a desirable future and 
subsequently work backwards to disclose pathways to realise it. Something similar might be done 
in assessing emerging technologies (Brey 2012), or for purposes of value sensitive design 
(Friedman and Hendry 2019): identify technomoral futures which differ in terms of their moral 
desirability and subsequently adjust technology design to make the actualisation of the more 
desirable futures more probable.  
Anticipatory models and scenarios do not aim to predict what will occur in the future. 
Attempts at predicting the future of complex societal dynamics have a record of being hubristic 
(Jasanoff 2003; van de Poel 2016). Instead, the current generation of approaches in foresight ethics 
(Floridi & Strait 2020) seeks to anticipate what might occur in the future. Given the limitations of 
our knowledge, as well as the indeterminacy of how causal pathways towards the future unfold, 
this implies that analysts should anticipate a range of possible moral futures (cf. Boenink et al. 
2010). On the one hand, this moderates futurists’ predictive ambitions, but it makes the undertaking 
more rigorous in turn. Rather than succumbing to the tunnel-vision of envisioning only one future, 
the aim of anticipatory studies should be to generate a sketch of the broader landscape of future 
possibilities. 
A proviso needs to be added, however: mere possibilities that do not stand a serious chance 
of becoming actual provide are a distraction to futurists and should be excluded from this broader 
vista. In other words, some sort of plausibility requirement should play a role in scenarios of future 
value change. As of yet, little reflection has been given regarding the precise nature of this 
requirement. Arguably, the most rigorous methodological proposal to date for studying the future 
dynamics of moral change has been outlined by Danaher (2021). Under the header of “axiological 
futurism”, Danaher proposes systematically exploring “axiological possibility space” and outlines 
tools for navigating it. Danaher is aware that the vastness of axiological possibility space poses a 
challenge for this undertaking. He concurs that speculations about how values might change over 
time should exclude farfetched possibilities and be restricted to possibilities that can be dubbed 
realistic, in some relevant sense. But how, exactly, should this realism criterion be understood? 
Neither Danaher’s work, nor existing research on technomoral change (e.g. Swierstra 2013), 
provides a worked-out view to answer this question. Possibilities come in different sizes and 
shapes. Philosophers commonly distinguish between logical, metaphysical, and physical 
possibilities, and various further modal categories can be distinguished: epistemic possibilities, 
conceptual possibilities, and so on. Which of these, if any, are the kinds of possibilities that 
anticipatory scenarios should focus on?  
This article proposes an answer to this question, and thereby seeks to further the project of 
axiological futurism. Its answer, to wit, will be to take the plausibility requirement at face value: 
axiological futurists should seek to approximate the historically indexed notion of “real 
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possibilities”.1 In the spirit of constructive criticism, I will argue for this claim while engaging with 
Danaher’s (2021) framework, which provides the most rigorous methodological outline for 
studying future value change to date. But I take the lessons to be equally applicable to the 
technomoral change literature and to anticipatory approaches in the ethics of technology more 
broadly: these should be restricted to identifying realistic possibilities, and a historically oriented 
approach can provide important insights as to what such possibilities may amount to.     
The second proposal of this article pertains to the normative aims of axiological futurism. 
Axiological futurism may be regarded as a value-neutral tool, whose aims are purely anticipatory. 
But as noted, the tool can be incorporated in frameworks of anticipatory ethics and value sensitive 
design, whose aims are explicitly normative. I will argue that when employing the tool with 
normative aims, axiological futurists can benefit from adhering to a further criterion. Not only 
should they focus on identifying realistic possibilities; additionally, they should seek to identify 
realistic possibilities that are distinctly risky. I make this argument by drawing an analogy with 
anticipatory efforts in climate discourse. Recent debates in climate science, reflected in the latest 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2021), suggest that for purposes 
of decision-making in the face of deep uncertainty, a concerted effort to pin down the respective 
likelihoods of different future scenarios may not be very helpful. Instead, the bulk of decision-
relevant information pertains to the question of which impacts that are regarded as particularly 
harmful, constitute realistic risks. Since similar – if not greater – uncertainty besets anticipations 
of future value change, axiological futurists are well advised to adopt a similar focus on identifying 




Axiological Futurism and the “Mere Possibilities” Challenge 
Let me begin by recapitulating how Danaher conceives of the project of anticipating future value 
change, an inquiry he calls “axiological futurism”. A key aspect of the methodology he proposes 
to conduct this inquiry centres on the notion of an “axiological possibility space”. An axiological 
possibility space represents a possible constellation of future values. The representation need not 
be comprehensive: it might single out a few future possibilities rather than sketching the range of 
possibilities in its entirety. For present purposes, however, let us consider the entire set of possible 
future value trajectories. Thus understood, studying future value change involves the systematic 
exploration of axiological possibility space.  
 What possibilities are encapsulated in this space? For one, this can be gauged by studying 
the extant diversity of moral theories and codes adopted in current societies. As Danaher (pp. 4–5) 
observes, moral frameworks typically specify the following four components:  
(i) An axiology: a theory specifying what counts as good and what counts as bad (“values” 
and “disvalues”). 
(ii) Agents and patients: a specification of what makes someone or something a moral 
subject and/or an object of moral concern.  
(iii) Internal relations: a specification of the relationships between the different elements 
within an axiology, such as their respective priority.  
 
1 Real possibilities have previously been discussed in the philosophical literature, albeit in a rather different context, namely 
the metaphysical debate over indeterminism and free will (Müller et al. 2018). Since this metaphysical context is tangential to 
the current discussion, I set it aside in this paper.  
 4 
(iv) Pattern of outcome: a specification of the appropriate pattern according to which moral 
goods ought to be procured (e.g. maximisation of goods; sufficiency for each agent; 
etc.). 
These parameters do not only vary amongst extant moral frameworks, but also provide an 
indication of how morality might change over time: the identification of moral values and disvalues 
may shift, the circle of moral concern may expand or contract, the priority of values and subjects 
may change, and the favoured pattern of outcome may alter (cf. van de Poel 2021). 
To give an example of the former – changes at the axiological level – consider the value of 
equality. As Danaher observes: 
 
“Philosophers have identified dimensions or parameters along which different conceptions of 
[this value] can vary. A theory of equality, for example might vary along two dimensions: 
equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. Given these two parameters, a researcher can 
construct a simple 2 × 2 logical space for the value of equality, classifying different possible 
axiologies depending on whether they score high or low on those two dimensions.” (p. 6)  
 
Put in modal terms, philosophers have previously identified different conceptual possibilities 
associated with the value of equality. In turn, these can be rendered as parameters in axiological 
possibility space. Which possibilities, however, are admissible? Here axiological futurism faces a 
challenge, as Danaher acknowledges: 
 
“Presumably, axiological possibility space is vast — much larger than anyone can really 
imagine. But equally, many of the ‘possible’ axiologies within this space are not that plausible 
or interesting: e.g. a world in which the subjective pleasure we experience while scratching our 
knees is the only recognised good may be possible (in some thin sense of the word ‘possible’) 
but is not very plausible and should not concern us greatly. [Therefore] we need some 
constraints on the boundaries of axiological possibility space to make the project feasible.” (p. 
5) 
 
Danaher rightly stresses that axiological futurists should not rest content with outlining mere 
possibilities. Instead, they should take on the more challenging task of outlining possibilities that 
are realistic, in some relevant sense. But how to judge whether this is the case?  
 Danaher provides two suggestions to this effect. First, a wide range of evidential sources 
provide insight into what is – and is not – possible in terms of moral change, much of which goes 
beyond strictly philosophical work. Values differ in current societies, they have varied throughout 
the course of history, and they are associated with distinct psychological traits. These variations 
and associations shed light on the diversity of possible value systems, as well as some of the 
constraints thereupon. To give one example, Danaher refers to moral foundations theory, which 
suggests that there are five or six robust dimensions of value in human moral psychology (Graham 
et al., 2013). If this is correct, and these five or six dimensions are recurring pillars for any moral 
system, then this sets constraints on the kinds of variations that moral systems can take. Similar 
kinds of insight about the breadth and constraints of moral possibility space might arise from fields 
of inquiry such as evolutionary anthropology (e.g. Henrich 2020), comparative human ecology 
(e.g. Flanagan 2017), as well as the study of human history (e.g. Morris 2015).  
Secondly, constraints can be discerned from existing work in axiological theory. This work 
suggests, for instance, that there is a fixed set of items that can be included in any possible list of 
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goods/bads, such as “subjective pleasure, desire satisfaction, knowledge, friendship, beauty, 
education, health, money, family [and] food” (Danaher, p. 5). The same holds for the kinds of 
entities that are ascribed a certain moral status (e.g. all humans, all sentient beings, all living 
entities), or the relationships that exist between them (e.g. equal treatment vs hierarchical 
treatment). While there certainly exists a substantial amount of moral diversity, we already seem 
to possess a good idea of what this diversity amounts to.  
I submit that the general outline of Danaher’s twofold response to the “mere possibilities” 
challenge is along the right lines, but its details need refining. Danaher is certainly right to draw 
lessons from empirical sciences and history in ascertaining what is – and is not – possible in terms 
of future value change. In fact, I maintain that these lessons might be taken even further and should 
outweigh the conceptual considerations that Danaher additionally appeals to. Consider his appeal 
to existing work in axiology, which suggests that the sets of goods that can be contained in any 
value system are fairly static. This appeal seems difficult to reconcile with the apparently open-
ended character of the value changes that have occurred throughout history. The value of 
sustainability, for instance, does not seem to be reducible to any of the items in the abovementioned 
set of goods. Historically, this value was only clearly articulated – and has become widely endorsed 
– since the last decades of the 20th century (van de Poel 2021). Or consider the value of privacy, 
which – like many other values – has been interpreted differently in different historical epochs 
(Holvast 2009), transforming from a physical notion to an informational notion. Given that the 
conceptualisation of values evolves over time, an inventory of the conceptual diversity currently 
recognised in philosophical work is likely to provide a skewed and overly narrow picture.   
There is reason to think, then, that axiological possibility space should be rendered more 
dynamic than Danaher’s account allows for. My proposal, to this effect, is that the axiological 
futurist’s framework be more thoroughly historicised. This proposal goes hand in hand with a 
suggestion to further explicate the conceptual aim of axiological futurism. What, exactly, are the 
kinds of possibilities that axiological futurists should seek to identify? I answer this question in the 
next section, arguing that axiological possibility space should be understood in terms of the 
temporally indexed notion of realistic possibilities. 
 
 
Realistic Possibilities: A Historicist Approach 
Real possibilities are those possibilities that might actualise, conditional on the state of the world 
at a specific moment in time. Hence, at some point in time t, the set of real possibilities consists in 
all states-of-affairs whose realisation is compatible with the state-of-the-world at time t (Betz 
2016). Real possibilities differ from other kinds of possibility that regularly feature in philosophical 
discussions, such as logical, conceptual and physical possibilities, in virtue of being a temporal 
notion. They are anchored in concrete situations and oriented towards the future: what is really 
possible at any given moment is what can temporally evolve from a concrete situation against the 
background of what the world is like (Müller et al., 2018). As time passes, real possibilities can 
become more proximate or remote: what was once a far-fetched possibility may turn into an 
adjacent possibility over time, or vice versa. The remoteness of a possibility depends on its ease of 
realisation: the more difficult this realisation is, the less realistic it becomes (Hopster 2018).  
While real possibilities are a metaphysical notion, they have their epistemic counterpart in 
what I call realistic possibilities: possibilities that we judge to be realistic to the best of our 
knowledge. When it comes to sketching scenarios about what might realistically occur in the future, 
our aim is to approximate the real possibilities as close as we can. The totality of our background 
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knowledge is relevant for this purpose: at minimum, our identification of realistic possibilities 
should be compatible with this background knowledge (Betz 2010). But arguably, this minimal 
constraint does not suffice: many propositions that are not obviously excluded by our background 
knowledge seem highly improbable, nonetheless. To reiterate Danaher’s (p. 5) example, in a thin 
sense of being “possible”, there might be a possible future world in which the subjective pleasure 
we experience while scratching our knees is the only recognised good. Arguably, our background 
knowledge does not strictly exclude this possibility. However, neither is there any positive support 
for this proposition. In the absence of such support, it should be disqualified as a realistic 
possibility.  
What matters, then, for a possible state-of-affairs to be included in the set of realistic 
possibilities is not only that our background knowledge does not exclude it, but also that we can 
give it some positive epistemic support. Such support might consist, for instance, of outlining the 
mechanism which could give rise to this state-of-affairs: if this mechanism is well understood and 
deemed scientifically plausible, then the state-of-affairs is realistically possible. Historical 
precedents are another source of insight into realistic possibilities: if some state-of-affairs obtained 
in the past, then ceteris paribus it might also obtain in the future. Considerations like these are quite 
relevant, for instance, in the context of assessing long-term risks of climate change (Parker and 
Risbey 2015). Our historical and geological record of mass extinctions, rapid temperature shifts 
and massive sea-level rise provide an important evidential source to take the prospect of radical 
long-term change due to anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions very seriously (Hopster 2020a).  
Now, let us return to the project of axiological futurism. My conceptual claim is that the 
possibilities that axiological futurists should be after are realistic possibilities, understood in the 
above sense. Danaher’s (2021) approach to axiological futurism is largely consonant with this 
proposal: it is thoroughly multidisciplinary, takes input from evidence from various sources and 
pays specific attention to historical examples to calibrate axiological possibility space. But as noted, 
Danaher’s reliance on conceptual claims about the goods contained in all axiologies might be 
unduly restrictive and insufficiently anchored in an historical account of what state-of-affairs might 
evolve starting from our current position. His approach, I submit, can be historicised more fully. 
Armed with the notion of realistic possibilities, let me suggest four avenues to re-adjust the 
approach of axiological futurism along these lines. 
A first suggestion is to give explicit attention to processes moralisation and demoralisation 
(Buchanan and Powell 2017) in the anticipatory framework and to seriously entertain the notion, 
drawing on historical evidence, that such processes are surprisingly open-ended. Moral values can 
be reinterpreted over time, as the previously given example of privacy suggests. But human 
practices can also be moralised anew, leading to new values such as sustainability. Furthermore, 
practices may lose their moral significance. For examples of the latter, consider the value of 
chastity, which has lost much of its moral significance in the Western world since the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s and onwards (Hopster et al. MS). Or consider bastardy, which was heavily 
moralised until the early 20th century in England (Baker 2019), but has arguably become entirely 
devoid of moral significance in English society today. A further dimension of moralisation is the 
objectification of moral issues (Hopster and Klenk 2020; Wright 2021), which can similarly shift 
as time passes. Rather than setting out with a fixed list of goods and bads, axiological futurists 
might be better served by incorporating the sliding scales of moralisation and objectification as key 
dimensions in axiological possibility pace. 
How can we anticipate, however, which objects and entities may be (de)moralised in the 
future? A second suggestion for the axiological futurist is to take seriously the idea that morality 
 7 
evolves through societal pressures (Anderson 2016; Hopster 2020b; Smyth 2020) and that moral 
norms and values can often be understood as a functional response to the problems of communal 
life that societies have historically faced (Kitcher 2011). If this view is along the right lines, then 
we should expect that the major challenges societies will face in the future will similarly solicit a 
moral response. What will be the main challenge that societies are likely to face over the next few 
decades? And what pressures might these challenges exert on moral norms and values? To view 
moral evolution as a process of historical, societal learning (Hopster 2020a), which typically occurs 
reactively in the face of the challenges that sociotechnical and environmental predicaments 
engender, provides a helpful angle to get some hold of the realistic possibilities of the future.  
Building on this approach, a third suggestion to the axiological futurist is to come up with 
a more detailed framework of what is involved in stabilising and disrupting values (Hopster 2021b). 
For instance, to what extent do socioeconomic and technological background conditions correlate 
with the adoption of specific value regimes? To what extent do such conditions enable, or even 
determine, the respective moral frameworks? As Danaher acknowledges, historical work (esp. 
Morris 2015) can provide a rich source for answering these questions, and so can various insights 
from human biology, sociology and anthropology (e.g. Flanagan 2017). But the merits of these 
sources notwithstanding, a fully-fledged account of how values are stabilised in the interplay with 
broader societal and technological dynamics is still forthcoming. In this regard, I propose that it 
might be specifically helpful to scrutinise the promise of (techno)moral niche construction 
(Severini 2016; Hopster et al. MS) as a conceptual framework to describe and anticipate processes 
of moral change. 
My fourth suggestion to the axiological futurist is to study indicators of value change. 
Consider moral disagreement: is this a reliable indicator of impending moral change? Or does this 
depend on the nature of the disagreement in question (e.g. Hansson 2018)? Conversely, is the 
historical inertness of a value a reliable indicator of its future stability? Or does this depend, for 
instance, on whether the inertness has resulted from a process of diverse and critical interrogation 
(Hopster 2017; cf. Longino 1990)? As it stands, these questions are under-theorised. But as noted, 
the project of investigating moral change, as outlined in the introduction of this article, has only 
recently taken off in earnest. A more rigorous theoretical framework of how morality can change, 
and of what is predictive of moral changes, will give a better hold on assessing the realistic 
possibilities of value change that lie ahead.    
 
 
Lessons from Climate Scholarship: Scenarios and Risk 
There are some notable parallels between anticipatory projects in the philosophy of technology and 
in climate scholarship. Global warming is a slow-moving and long-term process; some of its 
impacts are likely to be felt over the course of decades, centuries and beyond (Gardiner 2011). As 
a result, much of climate science – as well as climate policy and climate ethics – is decidedly future-
oriented. The instruments that climate scientists have developed to make projections about climate 
futures are very sophisticated and have emerged through decades of concerted scientific effort 
(Winsberg 2018). This holds, in particular, for the computer simulations used in the Climate Model 
Intercomparison Project (CMIP), which constitute the basis for the climate projections outlined by 
the IPCC.  
The advanced state of the art in climate modelling makes this field an interesting example 
for anticipatory endeavours in the philosophy of technology, which are by and large still in an 
explorative stage. A further commonality between anticipatory efforts in these domains is that both 
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are couched in substantial uncertainty. Their sophistication notwithstanding, projections derived 
from climate models come along with various uncertainties (Hopster 2022), for instance due to 
potential measurement errors, the natural variability of the climate system, the unknown external 
forcings on the climate system, the idealisations of simulation models, as well as the potential 
aggrandisement of model biases through their merger in ensembles like CMIP (e.g. Baumberger et 
al., 2017).  
Building on CMIP models, key pieces of information provided to decision-makers are the 
projected pathways of the Earth’s mean surface temperature during the 21st century, conditional on 
different anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission scenarios, as well as the likelihood that certain 
tipping points in the climate system will be crossed. While these projections and likelihoods are 
carefully argued for and meticulously justified, this is done in a framework primarily oriented 
towards scientific understanding rather than a framework oriented towards decision-making about 
climate risks (cf. Sutton 2019). By way of illustration, the statement that because of climate change, 
the Atlantic gulf stream might be overturned during the 21st century has been dubbed “highly 
unlikely” by the IPCC, based on modelling efforts (IPCC 2014). Judged by the criteria outlined in 
the previous section, however, it should probably be included in the set of realistic possibilities. 
Furthermore, it is a possibility with a serious risk attached to it, as the overturning of the gulf stream 
is likely to have many corollary impacts that will engender major harm. 
For these reasons, in recent years several climate scholars have grown critical about the 
dominance of CMIP models, combined with the IPCC’s predictive statements couched in terms of 
likelihood, in informing climate policy-makers (e.g. Shepherd et al. 2018). Arguably, given the 
uncertainty that is inherent in modelling efforts, CMIP projections should not be the main focal 
point to anchor policy-decisions in the face of the imminent dangers of global warming. Instead, 
as a policy instrument, these projections should be complemented with scenario approaches, which 
are better suited for communicating realistic possibilities in the face of deep uncertainty. A 
prominent scenario approach that is currently being developed along these lines is the storyline 
approach (Sillmann et al. 2021). A storyline is defined as “a physically self-consistent unfolding of 
past events, or of plausible future events or pathways” (Shepherd et al. 2018, p. 555). Storylines do 
not have any specific probability attached to them. Instead, typical storylines single out compound 
risks that arise because of climate change (Zseischler et al. 2020). In doing so, they focus on 
identifying realistic possibilities that matter from a normative point of view. This approach fits well 
with core principles of disaster risk management (King et al. 2015). In its latest report, the IPCC 
(2021) similarly endorses the principles of a disaster risk management approach, and has increased 
its emphasis on communicating findings regarding low-likelihood, high-impact events. 
There are two lessons of this recent debate in climate scholarship, I submit, that should be 
taken to heart by axiological futurists. The first lesson speaks to Danaher’s suggestion to extent 
axiological futurism with the help of computer-assisted models (Danaher 2021, passim). While 
such efforts are likely to be valuable, they should not be pursued in isolation. Model-based 
approaches should be developed alongside more qualitatively oriented scenarios, as each of these 
pursuits comes with its own advantages (Challinor 2018 et al.). When it comes to anticipating value 
change, scenario approaches may be even more important than in climate science. This is because 
the dynamics of value change are arguably more historically contingent, and therefore more 
difficult to predict, than the dynamics of climate change. Under conditions of greater uncertainty, 
the usefulness of scenario-approaches, relative to modelling-approaches, increases. Concretely, one 
might take from this that current theorising on technomoral change (e.g. Boenink et al. 2010), 
which has specifically adopted the scenario-approach as its preferred method, should not simply be 
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discarded to give way to Danaher’s more formal framework. Instead, axiological possibility spaces 
may be regarded as an instrument to contribute to the rigour of technomoral scenarios.  
The second lesson we can take from climate scholarship concerns the normative aims of 
anticipatory studies. As discussed in the previous section, axiological possibility space should be 
tailored to identifying realistic possibilities. An important aspect of the criticism of current 
approaches to climate modelling is that modellers seek to outline the full range of scientifically 
credible possibilities. In doing so, they insufficiently focus on highlighting what – from a risk 
perspective – are the most salient possibilities among these: the outliers and extremes, the tipping 
points, and the catastrophes that may ensue. Hence, from a normative point of view, climate 
modellers should arguably have a distinct focus on higlighting possibilities of substantial harm – 
provided, of course, that these possibilities satisfy the epistemic standard of being realistic (Hopster 
2021a). 
Axiological futurists should not fall into the same trap. When operationalized in the context 
of normative frameworks, such as anticipatory ethics or value sensitive design, the aim of 
anticipatory endeavours should not be to outline axiological possibility space in a fully 
comprehensive manner. There may simply be too many realistic possibilities of value change to 
entertain, not all of which are equally significant from a normative point of view. Furthermore, 
given the deep uncertainty at issue, efforts to predict which future value changes are particularly 
likely to occur may be futile. Instead, a more promising route is to first identify which future value 
changes, from a normative point of view, would be particularly significant – for instance because 
they directly compromise the normative aims of a given technological design, or because they 
would render the design harmful. Hence, the first step is to pinpoint the most salient normative 
risks posed by future value change. Subsequently, building on the epistemic toolkit of the 
axiological futurist, engineers and ethicists should ascertain whether these prospects of “risky 
future value change” can be regarded as realistic. If they pass the realism threshold, then it is crucial 
that engineers make adaptable designs, such that the potentially adverse consequences of risky 




I have argued for a further crystallisation of the conceptual aims of axiological futurism and 
proposed avenues to advance it, both as an anticipatory framework and as a normative tool. First, 
anticipatory accounts of value change can benefit from being firmly anchored in our historical 
understanding of moral change. Accordingly, the notion of an “axiological possibility space” can 
be usefully spelt out in terms of realistic possibilities. Realistic possibilities are historically 
conditioned. One important strategy to identify realistic possibilities of future value change is by 
considering which processes of moralisation and demoralisation might occur, in the wake of future 
challenges that societies are likely to face. Secondly, I have argued that we should take seriously 
the lessons from recent climate change scholarship, which serve to underline that where morally 
relevant – and potentially harmful – yet uncertain changes are at play, purely anticipatory scenarios 
can be toothless. Such scenarios should be combined with a disaster risk mitigation approach, 
aimed at avoiding particularly bad outcomes. 
While these considerations are theoretical, they can find a more practical application, for 
instance, in processes of value sensitive design. What engineers can take from the former historical 
lesson, is to think seriously about processes moralisation and demoralisation, and the historical 
pressures thereto, as being crucial to the dynamics of value change. To make technological designs 
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that are resilient to value change, then, a key task for engineers is to assess whether the values 
embedded in their designs are likely to shift in terms of their moral significance and which features 
of their designs might plausibly be moralised in the future. What engineers can take from the latter, 
risk-based approach, is that assessing their designs to identify which evaluative components 
constitute the most likely candidates to be subject to future value change may not be the best way 
to proceed. Instead, efforts should be made to identify realistic value changes that make a design 
specifically vulnerable from a moral point of view, and to mitigate the potentially harmful 
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